This paper examines the interplay of the financing and hedging decisions of a risk-averse multinational firm having a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. Exchange rate risk management of the multinational firm is shown to have direct impacts on its international capital structure decision and on its currency of denomination decision. If a currency forward market exists, the multinational firm will devise its international capital structure so as to minimize the global weighted average cost of capital. Or else the multinational firm has to rely on a money market hedge through issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic currency denominated debt, thereby resulting in a higher global weighted average cost of capital.
One of the major questions raised by multinational firms is how multiple currencies affect their capital structure choices (Hodder and Senbet, 1990; Giddy, 1994) . Shapiro (1984) and Rhee, Chang, and Koveos (1985) refer to this question as the currency of denomination decision for debt financing. As documented by Keloharju and Niskanen (1997) , multinational firms with exports constituting a significant fraction of turnover are most likely to raise foreign currency denominated debt, implying a strong hedging motive behind the currency of determination decision for debt financing.
The capital structure decision in an international setting may involve a rather complicated flow of funds between parent firms and foreign subsidiaries. For example, a foreign subsidiary may be funded by its retained earnings, by intra-firm debt or equity transfers from its parent, or by local borrowing. Similarly, a parent may be funded by its retained earnings, by new share issues, or by debt. To address the international capital structure decision in general and the currency of determination decision in particular, we present a single-period model of a multinational firm having a whollyowned foreign subsidiary and facing exchange rate uncertainty. The model is enriched with the choice of currency for debt being an integral part of exchange rate risk management.
If the multinational firm is privately held and owner-managed, it is reasonable to assume risk-averse behavior. Even in the case that the multinational firm is publicly listed, managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984) , corporate taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985) , costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) , and capital market imperfections (Stulz, 1990; and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993) all imply a concave objective function for the multinational firm. Thus, we use risk aversion as an approximation for these imperfections.
The results of this paper show how exchange rate movements, multiple tax jurisdictions, segmented capital markets, and currency forward markets jointly determine the optimal international capital structure and the best mix of currencies. If the risk-averse multinational firm has access to an unbiased currency forward market, we show that the firm will choose its international capital structure to minimize the global weighted average cost of capital. In this case, neither the attitude towards risk of the firm nor the incidence of exchange rate uncertainty play a role in determining the optimal mix of financing of the firm. In contrast, if the firm has no access to the currency forward market, we show that the firm has to rely on a money market hedge via issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic currency denominated debt. This hedging strategy results in a distortion that the global weighted average cost of capital exceeds the minimum level.
Elliott, Huffman, and Makar (2003) and Nguyen and Faff (2004) document that foreign currency denominated debt and foreign currency derivatives appear to be substitutes in hedging foreign currency risk for US multinational corporations and for Australian firms, respectively. Our model thus offers a theoretical rationale for their empirical findings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we develop a single-period model of a risk-averse multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty. In Section 2, we characterize the multinational firm's optimal hedging decision when an unbiased currency forward market exists. Section 3 derives the firm's optimal international capital structure decision when the optimal currency forward hedge is in place. Section 4 examines the implications of exchange rate risk management on the international capital structure decision and on the currency of denomination decision. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
The model
Consider a risk-averse multinational firm that makes decisions in a singleperiod horizon with two dates, indexed by t = 0 and 1. The parent-firm, domiciled in the home country, has a wholly-owned subsidiary located in a foreign country. At date 0, the parent requires a fixed investment, I p , to
